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I
INTRODUCTION
Stephen Calkins’ article, which draws on his considerable experience in
navigating through the legal system, provides an impressive road map of many
critical issues currently facing the system.1  Should corporate misconduct be
controlled through criminal or administrative penalty procedures?  Should
these procedures focus on entities or on individuals?  Should the goal be deter-
rence or compensation of harms?  My comments will sketch a few additional
landmarks onto this road map from a researcher’s perspective, drawing pri-
marily on my two decades of empirical research on deterrence theory.
I hope to convey some of the interesting policy implications of recent deter-
rence research.  Many people still think that deterrence models focus exclu-
sively on the use of legal penalties to control clearly defined misconduct perpe-
trated by fully informed, rational corporations.  However, more recent analyses
attempt to identify the relative costs and benefits associated with alternative
enforcement strategies in typical complex settings like those described by
Calkins.  This research continues to focus on economic efficiency, but now in-
corporates broader institutional and motivational analyses in order to under-
stand the increasingly complex institutional structures and policy objectives in-
volved in mitigating a growing range of social harms.
I will begin with a brief discussion of the simple deterrence model, which
still provides a powerful analytic tool for the conditions that match its assump-
tions.  I will then describe the extensions developed during the past two dec-
ades that address the following issues: (1) bounded rationality and the problem
of corporate errors; (2) ambiguity of rules and cooperative enforcement; (3)
collective action and voluntary compliance; and (4) prosecutorial discretion and
the accountability of enforcement agencies.   Each of these issues has quite dif-
ferent implications for the theory of deterrence as well as for the practical is-
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sues of designing a legal system based on individual versus entity liability,
criminal versus administrative sanctions, and punishment versus compensation.
II
THE SIMPLE DETERRENCE MODEL
Bentham’s original deterrence calculus argued that compliance with the law
was dependent on increasing the pain associated with getting caught to the
point that it canceled out the pleasures and profits associated with breaking the
law.  The economic models developed by Becker, Stigler, and Posner provided
a powerful restatement of this calculus in the framework of microeconomic
theory.2  The application of these early deterrence models to corporate miscon-
duct relied on four simplifying assumptions in order to define the critical en-
forcement problem: (1) corporations are fully-informed utility maximizers; (2)
legal statutes unambiguously define misbehavior; (3) legal punishment provides
the primary incentive for corporate compliance; and (4) enforcement agencies
optimally detect and punish misbehavior, given available resources.  These as-
sumptions allowed the use of powerful microeconomic models that produced
clear implications for setting optimal penalties, optimal detection strategies,
and optimal statutes given optimal compliance rates.
The appeal of these early models extended beyond the powerful policy
tools they provided and well beyond the intentions of the authors, for they fit
well with the popular morality play so often portrayed in movies of America’s
western frontier.  Greedy black-hatted bad guys imposed costly social harms on
innocent citizens until the white-hatted sheriff established laws and coerced the
bad guys to behave.  The application of this model to greedy corporations im-
posing health, safety, and environmental harms on society was a common fea-
ture, ironically, of anti-market public interest groups; these groups demanded
the creation of well-armed regulatory agencies to counter-balance corporate
power and deter corporate misbehavior.
When I began my research on regulatory enforcement and compliance two
decades ago, I believed that these models were powerful enough to explain
most of the important features of regulatory compliance and enforcement poli-
cies.  I still believe that they are very important in the conditions corresponding
to the initial assumptions—where individuals and corporations are motivated
primarily by legal penalties and where laws are clear and legitimate.  However,
I am now convinced that the four assumptions capture a very small, albeit im-
portant, part of a much larger picture.
My own quest for more satisfactory assumptions was driven primarily by
puzzles that arose in my empirical tests of deterrence models, as illustrated by
the following four examples.
                                                          
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
SCHOLZ.FMT 09/17/98  8:00 AM
Page 253: Summer 1997] DETERRENCE THEORY 255
1.  Workplace safety in plants inspected by OSHA improves after
penalties are imposed.  Surprisingly, however, the size of the pen-
alty has little impact on safety improvements, contradicting the ba-
sic premise of deterrence theory that large expected penalties ex-
plain compliance.3
 
2.  Deterrence-oriented strategies are less effective in reducing
workplace injuries than cooperative enforcement strategies that
use punishments less frequently but more intensively.4
 
3.  Taxpayers’ fears of being caught if they cheat have no relation-
ship to objective risks,5 and have less impact on compliance than do
taxpayers’ trust in government and the duty to pay taxes.6  Trust
and duty respond predictably to government behavior.7
 
4.  The intensity of enforcement activities varies across jurisdictions
and time to satisfy local and national political demands.8
These puzzles illustrate anomalies associated with each of the four simpli-
fying deterrence assumptions previously listed.  Each extension focuses on a
different problem in controlling corporate misconduct from the first list, and
each has different implications for the design of legal systems and enforcement
policy.  The following sections discuss extensions of each assumption that have
developed during the past two decades to explain these anomalies.
III
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE ERRORS
One modest extension of deterrence theory incorporates the assumption
that the function of the legal system is to keep the risk of social harms arising
from inevitable corporate mistakes within tolerable limits.  This function, and
the problems in pursuing it, is perhaps most evident in the actions of regulatory
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agencies overseeing nuclear and airline safety, where the potential social harm
from corporate errors are widely recognized.  However, error correction plays
an important and under-appreciated role even in the mundane, daily enforce-
ment practices of most regulatory agencies.
Consider the first empirical puzzle noted above, the common finding that
the probability of detection deters illegal behavior, but that the size of punish-
ment does not seem to matter—at least not in the normal range of administra-
tive punishments imposed by regulatory agencies.  Gray and Scholz suggest
that inspections imposing penalties result in improved safety because they focus
managerial attention on risks that may otherwise have been overlooked.9  It is
not the miniscule penalty that makes OSHA inspections effective in reducing
injuries, but rather the concern of managers to prevent the costs associated with
accidents once they are aware of the risks.
This bounded rationality perspective emphasizes the limited ability of cor-
porations to achieve the goals they desire.  Busy managers have neither the
time, capability, knowledge, nor information required to maximize corporate
utility, but rather “satisfice” by choosing familiar alternatives that are good
enough for the current situation.10  While managers cope with problems causing
the most immediate concern, the level of risk in other areas can reach levels
that a fully informed manager would want to avoid.  Safety records improve af-
ter inspections that cite hazardous conditions for the same reason that safety
increases after major accidents—because then management resolves problems
that were overlooked while management was concerned elsewhere.  These er-
rors are particularly likely when the signs of increasing risk are infrequent and
difficult to interpret, as is the case with low-frequency, high-cost risks.  The is-
sues with the most ambiguous signs of risk frequently involve safety, health,
and environmental harms that are not clearly reflected in costs—that is, the
very issues that impose the greatest externality problems that regulatory poli-
cies attempt to resolve.
Of course, successful organizations install error-detection systems to reduce
exposure to known risks in a cost-effective manner, and insurance companies
provide a redundant source of safety standards and monitoring to control their
clients’ exposure to loss claims.  Public agency monitoring and safety standards
add an additional level of redundancy, one that generally has very different
emphases from the systems of corporations and their insurers.  Each error-
detection system is itself prone to failure, but redundant systems enhance the
likelihood that potentially catastrophic errors are detected and the corre-
sponding harms are prevented even if the corporate system fails.11
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Thus, the appropriate criteria for assessing the error correction function of
the legal system include: (1) the reversibility and ability to compensate for so-
cial harm (for example, simple monetary losses as compared with death or
permanent environmental degradation);  (2) the likelihood that corporate error
would produce the harm; (3) the potential reduction in probability or serious-
ness of harm that public monitors could produce; and (4) the direct and indirect
costs imposed by the public system.
The error-correction perspective attempts to “correct” corporate conduct
by reducing corporate mistakes that even corporations want to avoid.  It em-
phasizes the potential weakness in the liability approach due to tragic corporate
mistakes.  To reduce these mistakes, the perspective suggests policy solutions
that bolster the self-monitoring and error-correction mechanisms in corpora-
tions, third-parties (insurers, underwriters, etc.), or public monitors for situa-
tions when private systems appear most prone to error.
As an example of the policy implications of the error-correction perspec-
tive, consider the mundane issue of workplace safety.  Since mistakes from inat-
tention produce greater risk of harm, liability incentives sufficient to provide a
socially desirable level of safety in the most error-prone firms would result in
over-protection in the less error-prone firms.  For example, mid-sized work-
places generally have the greatest preventable safety problems.  A level of
workers’ compensation liability that is adequate for these workplaces would re-
sult in over-investment in safety by better-managed firms.  Rather than raising
liability, it therefore may be more efficient to target OSHA inspections on the
most error-prone firms to correct for the lessened impact of liability and insur-
ance incentives.12
The least understood problem from this perspective involves innovative
corporate activities whose social harms are discovered only after new products
are introduced or new processes adopted.  The innovation’s economic potential
generally is discovered long before the potential social harms are known;
knowledge about the social harm and efficient methods of preventing it is fre-
quently a public good, and therefore tends to be under-produced.  Policy solu-
tions attempt to impose adequate incentives for corporations to develop
knowledge of potential harms through pre-market approval mechanisms (for
example, the FDA requirements for prescription drugs) and the threat of en-
hanced class action litigation.13
                                                          
SECTORS (1990) (comparing public and private systems); CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS:
LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984) (discussing the limitations on reliability in preventing
major catastrophes); John T. Scholz, Reliability, Responsiveness, and Regulatory Policy, 44 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 145 (1984) (providing an extended presentation relevant to enforcement and regula-
tion).
12. The importance of adequate targeting strategies for enforcement actions is discussed in Wayne
B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Analyzing the Equity and Efficiency of OSHA Enforcement, 13 LAW &
POL’Y 185 (1991).
13. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (Autumn 1997).
SCHOLZ.FMT 09/17/98  8:00 AM
258 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 3
The redundancy principle suggests that multiple knowledge-generating sys-
tems may provide a less error-prone social learning mechanism than reliance
on even a well-motivated corporation.  Third-party insurers, consultants, and
regulatory agencies all develop specialized expertise based on overlapping but
quite different sets of experience, each with a different potential for discovering
patterns of harms that the individuals suffering the harms could not detect.
One of the least appreciated, and probably least developed, aspects of regula-
tory inspections and the promulgation of new regulations is the potential for
providing an independent social learning mechanism and for accelerating the
diffusion of harm-reduction technologies.14
IV
THE AMBIGUITY OF RULES AND COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT
A.  Rules
The simple deterrence model is most appropriate when legal statutes un-
ambiguously define corporate misbehavior.  However, rules are seldom capable
of defining the exact behavior desired of corporations, particularly when the
desired level involves a balance between harms produced, costs imposed, and
economic activities foregone.15  Rules uniformly applied to broad classes of
situations cannot readily take advantage of better alternatives available to con-
trol harms in specific situations.  A rule that makes an optimal tradeoff nation-
ally between harms prevented and costs imposed generally will be sub-optimal
locally, imposing requirements that are overly stringent in some settings and
overly lax in others.  As a practical matter, rules that are written to be clear to
the managers who must implement them may lack the enforceability important
to prosecutors or the detailed specification required by safety engineers.
Because of the inherent weaknesses in using rules to control corporate be-
havior, the deterrence goal of securing compliance to rules is of secondary im-
portance to achieving the purpose that the rules are designed to achieve.  Gen-
erally, rules are used to achieve a more desirable balance of harms, costs, and
economic activities than is achieved by market outcomes.  Successful deter-
rence techniques that achieved full compliance simply would exacerbate the in-
efficiencies inherent in rules.
B.  Cooperative Enforcement
Cooperative enforcement techniques, on the other hand, can reduce the in-
evitable inefficiencies of rules by allowing local tradeoffs on a case-by-case ba-
sis.  For example, the EPA could allow an innovative firm to use newly devel-
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oped cost-saving technology to control emissions as long as the new technique
reduced emissions by more than the legally required technology.16  Practically
every inspection encounters potential tradeoffs that could reduce both the lev-
els of harm that concern the agency and the compliance costs that concern the
corporation.  Minor violations can be overlooked in return for more effective
actions that reduce greater harms at lower costs.
The problem, of course, is that enforcement agencies and regulated firms
alike are tempted to take advantage of the other.  Inspectors and prosecutors
can insist on costly corrections of all violations even after the corporation took
voluntary action that reduced overall harms by far more than could be accom-
plished by full compliance.  In fact, the deterrence model implicitly encourages
this behavior.  Corporations can take advantage of cooperative inspectors,
however, by exaggerating claims of harm reduction and disguising the extent of
noncompliance and potential flaws in their voluntary actions.  Thus, both sides
face a dilemma in which cooperation could leave each better off than the deter-
rence outcome, but both sides are tempted to cheat on the other to gain an
even more favorable outcome.  Both sides also fear getting stuck with the
sucker’s payoff if the other side takes advantage of their cooperative actions.
As in the well-known prisoners’ dilemma, cooperative solutions to the en-
forcement dilemma are possible as long as the gains in cooperation from ex-
pected future encounters are greater than the current temptation to cheat.
Whenever the future is sufficiently important, an enforcement agency strategy
with the characteristics of “tit-for-tat” (cooperate initially, then do what the
other side did in the previous round) is capable of maintaining cooperation.17
Observers of regulatory enforcement have routinely noted that some agen-
cies follow practices that have the tit-for-tat characteristics of niceness
(overlook minor violations when overall compliance in critical areas is high),
vengefulness (hit uncooperative, intentional violators with big penalties), and
forgivingness (reestablish cooperation once a troublesome corporation has
demonstrated good faith).18  Indeed, one study has shown empirically that
OSHA jurisdictions following this cooperative strategy reduce workplace inju-
ries more efficiently than jurisdictions following a less flexible deterrence-based
approach.19
Cooperative enforcement emphasizes a different set of issues than the de-
terrence model.
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 1.  Big Penalties.  As Calkins emphasized, big penalties are of critical
importance to gain the cooperation of recalcitrant corporations.  In
addition, the size of the biggest credible threat determines the
bargaining power of the agency to secure reduced harms from all
cooperating firms.  Whether criminal or administrative in nature, the
size of the biggest penalties must be sufficiently large to overcome
any short-term temptation to cheat.
2.  The Penalty Pyramid.  A range of penalties allows agencies to
escalate the enforcement threat gradually when uncertainties about
the good faith of the corporation require some penalty response.
Given that corporations and agencies may erroneously perceive non-
cooperation in the action of the other, intermediate levels of
punishment may provide a cushion to re-establish cooperation more
rapidly when minor conflicts arise.  Cooperative enforcement
requires an array of punishments ranging from frequently imposed
minor penalties at the base of the punishment pyramid to the
seldom-imposed major penalties at the apex.20
3.  Prosecutorial Discretion.  The gains from cooperative
enforcement are based on the ability of the inspector to trade off
stringent enforcement in return for additional reductions in harm at
the plant level.  Enforcers must be able to “avoid both the mistake of
selecting a sledge hammer to swat a fly and selecting a flyswatter to
stop a charging bull.”21  The cooperative enforcement model in part
is based on the deterrence model’s assumption of a well-intended
and capable enforcement agency.  Much of the literature critiquing
the strategy of cooperative enforcement denies the validity of this
assumption, as discussed in Part VI on enforcement accountability.
4.  Coordinated Enforcement Strategies.  The profusion of local,
state, and federal agencies with overlapping enforcement authority
creates a problem for the development of cooperative strategies; the
threat of a single, deterrence-oriented prosecutor can undermine the
incentive of the corporation to cooperate with any of the other
agencies.  If deterrence were the only goal, then the “externalities”
of one agency’s prosecutions that Calkins discusses can only enhance
deterrence.  However, coordination of enforcement becomes
increasingly important in gaining the benefits of cooperative
enforcement.
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Without cooperative enforcement, ex ante control of corporate behavior
through the enforcement of rules is best limited to situations in which there is
sufficient expertise and consensus to create behavioral standards that are at
once efficient, practical, and enforceable.  Cooperative enforcement provides
some of the flexibility normally associated with ex post, liability-based control
of corporate behavior.  The liability system does not rely on rules enforced by a
government agency to deter corporate misconduct ex ante but rather holds cor-
porations responsible for damages they cause ex post.  As with the liability sys-
tem, cooperative enforcement requires that the principles behind the rules are
applied flexibly, and that enforcement agencies and corporations accept the
procedures established to legitimate the decisionmaking process.  As discussed
in the next two sections, the importance of legitimacy is not recognized by the
deterrence model.
V
GOVERNMENT AS FACILITATOR AND GUARANTOR OF AGREEMENTS:
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
The deterrence model reflects a common assumption that rules are imposed
on corporations against their wishes, and, therefore, that legal penalties provide
the primary motivation to counterbalance the profitability of misconduct.  The
model does not consider the more subtle relationship that occurs when corpo-
rations stand to gain if all corporations obey the law, but each corporation indi-
vidually benefits if they can free ride.
Tax collection provides perhaps the clearest and most important illustration
of this collective action problem.  Consider a society in which all taxpayers
would be better off if all paid their taxes and enjoyed the collective benefits
from public goods supported by taxes.  Individually, however, each taxpayer
would be better off cheating on taxes and free-riding on the contributions of
the other taxpayers.  Conventional wisdom and deterrence models frequently
assume that only fear of the IRS will keep “rational” taxpayers from free-riding
in such situations.
However, empirical research on the federal income tax consistently has
found that a sense of duty to pay taxes is at least as important as fear in pre-
dicting compliance.22  As noted above, one study found that taxpayers’ subjec-
tive beliefs about the likelihood of getting caught were completely unrelated to
objective risks that the IRS could detect cheating.23  If fear is unrelated to en-
forcement strategies, then enhanced enforcement cannot deter cheating.
Studies by Scholz and Lubell provide evidence that taxpayers’ compliance
strategies are more intelligent than the free-riding strategy assumed in deter-
                                                          
22. For a general review, see PANEL ON TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE RES., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL,
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rence theory.24  They show that compliance increases as trust toward the gov-
ernment and toward the honesty of other citizens increases, and also that trust
and the sense of duty to pay taxes honestly increase when government policies
(specifically the 1986 Tax Reform Act) prove to be beneficial to the taxpayer.
In other words, taxpayers are willing to pay taxes contingent on the behavior of
the government and other citizens.25  Unlike the free-riding strategy, contingent
compliance allows taxpayers to gain the advantage of cooperation in the provi-
sion of public goods, but at the same time protects them against exploitation by
political elites or by free-riding taxpayers.  The IRS supports contingent com-
pliance not by deterring each taxpayer, but rather by providing credible assur-
ances that other taxpayers are complying.
The collective action perspective has become increasingly relevant in mod-
ern economies where corporations and consumers alike rely on a complex array
of public and private institutions to provide cost-effective assurances about the
integrity of producers and merchants.26  The assurance role of the legal system
is perhaps clearest in the regulatory actions of agencies like the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, where regu-
lated firms as a whole gain with the expansion of trade made possible by credi-
ble markets.  In these as well as in other less obvious market situations, each
firm is tempted to free ride on the credibility established by competitors who
obey laws and market regulations.  The integrity of the market, like the integ-
rity of the tax system, depends on the ability of public and private institutions
to control the temptation for individual firms to take advantage of the system.
When corporations (like taxpayers in the previous example) share the col-
lective benefits from the law, deterrence alone provides too narrow a basis for
designing the legal system.  As Chester Bowles observed of compliance with
price controls during World War II, most companies will go along with regula-
tions perceived to benefit the market as long as the enforcement agency makes
a credible effort to identify and punish the small group of hardcore noncompli-
ers.27  “Voluntary compliance” by the majority is a contingent strategy that
gains the benefits of cooperation for the compliers as long as they can be as-
sured that others are not taking undue advantage of their compliance.  Yet co-
operation in dynamic economic settings is always a fragile condition that re-
quires constant maintenance.  This maintenance relies to a great extent on self-
enforcement and self-regulation by the industry, particularly for established
laws and accepted practices.28
                                                          
24. See generally Scholz & Lubell, supra note 6; Scholz & Lubell, supra note 7.
25. For a general discussion and historical case studies illustrating the strategy of contingent com-
pliance, see MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988).
26. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (expanding the transaction cost analysis of contracts and exchange
pioneered by Ronald H. Coase and developed by Oliver E. Williamson).
27. See generally CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1941-1969
(1971).
28. See generally Robert E. Lane, Why Businessmen Violate the Law, in WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINAL 88 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1968).
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Even when private institutions provide the primary motivation for compli-
ance, public institutions are required to fill two critical functions in support of
voluntary compliance.29  First, public institutions provide an arena to debate,
reinterpret, and legitimize changes in the standards of corporate conduct re-
quired in a dynamic economy.  All firms in a market potentially can benefit
from standards that enhance credibility, reduce transaction costs, and hence
expand the gains of specialization and trade.  But seldom will any individual
firm be sufficiently motivated by this gain to pay the costs necessary to develop
a new standard and gain the agreement of others.  Even if dominant corpora-
tions or trade associations overcome this initial collective action problem, some
of the firms among both buyers and sellers in the market inevitably will gain
more than others from any given standard.  Without a public forum capable of
imposing an agreement, the costs and difficulties of negotiating agreements
among multiple trade associations would reduce the likelihood and extent of
agreement.  By expanding the interests involved in defining the standards, a
public forum can broaden the social benefits achieved through compliance with
the resultant standard.  By maintaining a site for continuous discussion and
consideration, a public forum can provide added flexibility to reinterpret stan-
dards on the fly as changing conditions rapidly undermine the usefulness of
previous definitions of corporate misconduct.
The function of establishing and reinterpreting standards is served by public
institutions ranging from highly specialized regulatory agencies that follow
well-specified rulemaking procedures to the generalized system of prosecutors
and courts that reinterpret rules by deciding cases that set new precedents.  The
strengths and weaknesses of a given public institution in resolving a particular
type of collective action problem can be evaluated in terms of the actors af-
fected by the problem, the gains and losses for each actor associated with po-
tential agreements, and the transaction costs that provide an obstacle to agree-
ment.
The second critical function of public institutions in supporting voluntary
compliance is to bolster incentives to cooperate through enforcement actions.
Supporting voluntary compliance requires more subtle policies than deter-
rence-oriented enforcement optimally calculated to deter free-riding.  Al-
though we know surprisingly little about this support function of public en-
forcement, the following suggestions merit further consideration, debate, and
experimentation.
1. Limit Criminal Sanctions to Egregious Cases.  The Lynch article in this
volume argue that criminal sanctions should be limited to situations involving
blameworthiness and widely accepted definitions of egregious behavior.30  The
collective action perspective suggests that this limitation may be important to
                                                          
29. The two functions are discussed in John T. Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, Can Government Facili-
tate Cooperation?  An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 693 (1997).
30. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct,
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (Summer 1997).
SCHOLZ.FMT 09/17/98  8:00 AM
264 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 3
preserve the normative basis and consensual nature of voluntary compliance.
As Lane noted some time ago, shared norms and beliefs about legitimacy
provide an important basis for business relationships, because shared beliefs
and attitudes are important to sustain cooperative solutions.31  Imposing
criminal sanctions where necessary may be critical for sustaining shared beliefs,
while expanding criminal sanctions too rapidly may undercut them.  Non-
criminal penalties commensurate with the harms to be prevented may provide a
better motivational tool in settings where blameworthiness is controversial.
2.  Improve Procedural Fairness.  Tom Tyler’s studies have found that
perceptions of procedural fairness are at least as important as the objective
outcomes in determining compliance by individuals with court orders.32  The
perception of fair treatment and due process enhanced compliance even when
orders imposed considerable costs.  If perceptions of fairness support voluntary
compliance by corporations as well, then agency procedures should be designed
to enhance perceptions of fairness and to convince corporations of the
legitimacy and positive benefits from the law being enforced.33
3.  Revise Inadequate Rules.  Since voluntary compliance rests on the
collective advantages gained if rules are followed, rules that are perceived to be
illegitimate because they provide no collective advantage will weaken support
for voluntary compliance.  The enforcement process can compensate partially
for inadequate rules by not enforcing rules when they are inappropriate, as
noted in the discussion on cooperative enforcement.  Even better, enforcement
programs can include procedures to revise inadequate rules discovered during
the enforcement process.34  Unfortunately, the organizational separation of
enforcement and rulemaking functions in most agencies has diminished the
ability of field experience to revise inadequate rules.
4.  Target Enforcement at “Bad Apples.”  Perhaps the greatest challenge for
enforcement agencies is to maintain adequate vigil and impose sufficient fines
to deter recidivist non-compliers while treating voluntary compliers with
greater deference.  A critical task for targeting enforcement is to focus
attention on the weakest links in private or self-policing systems.  Inadequate
                                                          
31. See Lane, supra note 28, at 95.  For a general discussion of the role of norms and culture in
preserving cooperative solutions to collective action problems, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1982).  For a more technical game theoretic discussion, see Randall L. Calvert, Rational Ac-
tors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 216 (Jeffrey S. Banks &
Eric A. Hanushek eds., 1995); David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
32. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
33. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67, 72-74 (Keith O. Hawkins & John
M. Thomas eds., 1984).
34. For a description of an enforcement process that routinely revises inadequate rules, see
ROBERT A. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE (1978).
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enforcement in these settings destroys the credibility on which cooperation and
voluntary compliance is based.
5.  Strengthen and Encourage Private Enforcement Systems.  The more
credible the private enforcement systems, the less the burden on public systems
to provide assurances that those who voluntarily comply will receive the
expected collective benefit.  Trade associations can monitor members, and
corporations can monitor their competitors, sub-units, and employees more
efficiently than can public agencies.  When corporate monitors are not fully
credible, as in the case of workplace safety, public monitors may be used to
provide assurances necessary for the maintenance of voluntary compliance.35
When trade associations or corporations can detect misbehavior but lack the
means to punish it, as in the case of misbehavior by competitors, enforcement
agencies can use complaints to find the “bad apples.”
When corporations have the means of punishing subordinates for illegal be-
havior, punishing the corporation rather than individuals responsible for
wrongdoing may serve to strengthen the corporation’s private enforcement sys-
tem.  Criminal prosecution of individuals will be necessary, however, whenever
the potential gains to the individual from illegal behavior far exceed the worst
punishment the firm could impose, as Calkins notes.36
Arlen and Kraakman have stimulated an important debate on alternative
corporate liability strategies designed to enhance the self-policing system
within corporations.37  Calkins is not persuaded by their argument that the
presence of adequate corporate compliance programs should reduce liability
when wrongdoing is detected, at least within the domain of Fair Trade Prac-
tices.38  He argues that compliance programs are inherently inadequate if they
fail to prevent misconduct, and that recalcitrant corporations will establish
sham compliance programs to take advantage of reduced liability.39  The simple
deterrence model would support Calkins’ concerns.  The collective action per-
spective, on the other hand, suggests that policy innovations to encourage effi-
cient self-policing deserve serious evaluation for their potential to enhance vol-
untary compliance.
VI
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES
Perhaps the greatest challenge and least understood aspect of controlling
corporate misconduct involves the behavior of the public enforcement agencies
                                                          
35. See Scholz & Gray, supra note 29, at 703-04.
36. See Calkins, supra note 1, at 141-43.
37. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reiner Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
38. See Calkins, supra note 1, at 147-49.
39. See id.
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designed to define and control misconduct.  The simple deterrence model
avoids this issue, although economic models of regulation frequently emphasize
the adverse impact of organized political interests on regulatory agencies.40
As noted earlier, empirical studies confirm the conventional wisdom that
agencies adjust enforcement behavior in response to changes and variation in
their political environments—specialized federal regulatory agencies like
OSHA even step up enforcement actions in Democratic counties in comparison
to Republican ones.41  Given the range of tasks for public institutions, we need
to understand the motivations of public agencies and incorporate this under-
standing in the design of public enforcement institutions.
To illustrate the problem, consider the deterrence model’s prediction that
an increase in speeding fines will decrease speeding.  If we add the assumption
that police are motivated to decrease their enforcement effort, however, the ex-
tended model can show that the amount of speeding will remain constant and
only the number of tickets issued will decrease.42  Similarly, if we assume that
business interests can bribe or cajole inspectors, the model of cooperative en-
forcement discussed above leads not to more efficient reduction in harms, but
rather to less enforcement.43
The problem of ensuring the accountability of enforcement agencies is as
widely recognized as it is poorly understood.  Mistrust of agency discretion, as
noted earlier, appears to be the primary reason why groups who benefit from a
policy prefer deterrence-oriented enforcement even when cooperative en-
forcement leads to greater benefits.44  Policy beneficiaries insist on non-
discretionary “if you see it, cite it” enforcement of clear standards.
The more efficient approaches to corporate control discussed above are de-
pendent on the development of credible accountability mechanisms to provide
assurances that the potential gains will be achieved.  The four accountability
mechanisms listed below impose external reviews on the agencies:
1.   Formal Procedural Requirements.  From state-level Blue Skies
and Sunshine Acts to the federal Government Performance and Re-
view Act and the Clinton Administration’s National Performance
Review, legislation defines formal procedures and requirements that
regulatory agencies must follow.  Despite the frequency of use, the
                                                          
40. Among the earliest works are Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead
Weight Costs 28 J. PUB. ECON. 329 (1985); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regula-
tion, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
41. See Scholz et al., supra note 8, at 844.
42. See George Tsebelis, The Abuse of Probability Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy, 83 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 77, 82 (1989).
43. See Scholz, supra note 16, at 216.
44. See Scholz, supra note 4, at 121-22, 128-29.  The implications for enforcement strategies are
discussed in John T. Scholz, Political Education is Necessary to Foster Cooperative Regulatory En-
forcement, in CORPORATE LAWBREAKING AND INTERACTIVE COMPLIANCE 141, 149 (Jay A. Sigler &
Joseph E. Murphy eds., 1991).
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effectiveness and costs of these formal procedures are not well es-
tablished.
 
2.   Legislative and Executive Oversight.  Agency activities are re-
viewed by established legislative oversight committees as well as by
agencies like the Office of Management and Budget and the General
Accounting Office.  Oversight focuses primarily on general policy
rather than on enforcement problems, and appears to be limited to
the most salient public issues.
 
3.   Independent Commissions and External Boards.  Independent
management is intended to increase the political independence and
expertise of agencies.
 
4.   Interest Representation.  Agencies are required to encourage
participation of public interest groups to balance the influence of
regulated corporations in the regulatory process.
These external accountability mechanisms and their limitations are familiar.
Internal accountability mechanisms, on the other hand, are less familiar but
may have greater untapped potential for providing the broader assurances re-
quired for enhancing the effectiveness of enforcers to encourage voluntary
compliance.  Kaufman catalogues organizational procedures used to control the
discretion of field officers that range from report-writing requirements and
managerial reviews of subordinate behavior to training program manuals that
codify standard decision rules.45  Bardach and Kagan describe managerial tech-
niques for balancing the need of accountability with the flexibility required to
pursue cooperative enforcement techniques and enhance voluntary compli-
ance.46  Elsewhere in this volume, Lynch recommends an extended dialogue
among prosecutors as an informal means of standardizing the criteria used by
prosecutors to apply criminal sanctions in novel situations.47
Internal control mechanisms currently employed by enforcement agencies
generally restrict the discretion of field officers in an attempt to enhance simple
deterrence.  However, these mechanisms could be redesigned to channel en-
hanced discretion in ways that contribute to social learning, cooperative en-
forcement, and voluntary compliance.  Understanding the possibilities and limi-
tations of internal accountability mechanisms is a critical ingredient for
designing more effective institutions to reshape corporate activities.
                                                          
45. See generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER (1960).
46. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 15, at 152-83.
47. See Lynch, supra note 30, at 63-65.
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VII
CONCLUSION
The law and economics approach featured in this essay rejects the notion
that misconduct is primarily a simple matter of right and wrong to be controlled
by deterring misconduct.  The design of legal institutions is premised on the
broader goal of channeling corporate behavior in ways that enhance the gen-
eral welfare.  To achieve this goal, the basic assumptions of the simple deter-
rence model—fully informed corporations, unambiguous rules, legal penalties,
and well-behaved enforcement agencies—need to be extended in the directions
discussed above.
My goal is not to confirm or contradict the specific conclusions of the
Calkins article, but rather to provide four additional perspectives for consider-
ing the important issues he raises.  Policy debates can seldom be settled conclu-
sively when considered from only one perspective.  Each perspective empha-
sizes different problems, with policy implications that may conflict with
implications from the other perspectives.  As Calkins’ essay demonstrates, the
appropriate assumptions for analyzing any given problem depend on the par-
ticular characteristics of the problem and on the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of institutions involved in the problem setting.  Designing public institu-
tions and policies to deal with the problems of corporate error correction,
cooperative enforcement, voluntary compliance, and agency accountability de-
serve the serious attention of practitioners and scholars alike.
